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Investors and Employees as Relief 
Defendants in Investment Fraud 
Receiverships:  
Promoting Efficiency by Following the 
Plain Meaning of “Legitimate Claim or 
Ownership Interest”
JARED WILKERSON
Relief defendants are nominal, innocent parties who hold funds traceable 
to the receivership but have no legitimate claim or ownership interest in 
them. These nominal parties, as opposed to full or primary defendants, 
have no cause of action asserted against them, and if they show no 
legitimate claim to the funds traced to the receivership, the funds are dis-
gorged  —  generally at summary judgment.  This seemingly simple relief 
defendant tool is used by receivers and regulatory agencies to quickly 
recover receivership funds for ultimate distribution to creditors.  Recent-
ly, however, conflict has arisen in federal courts concerning the meaning 
of “legitimate claim or ownership interest.” Where courts fail to uphold 
the plain meaning of those words, confusion and unpredictability ensue, 
leading to enormous costs for creditors as receivers, on the receivership’s 
dime, attempt to claw back funds from relief defendants.  To prevent such 
unnecessary costs in the future, the plain meaning of “legitimate claim 
or ownership interest” must be reinforced to protect, at minimum, the 
amount of investors’ returned principal and the amount of employees’ 
reasonable compensation.
Published in the March 2011 issue of The Financial Fraud Law Report. 
Copyright 2011 ALEXeSOLUTIONS, INC. 1-800-572-2797.
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Imagine yourself as one of the tens of thousands of investors holding a certificate of deposit from Stanford International Bank in early 2009. The CD has the blessing of the SEC and CFTC and has performed 
beautifully for about 15 years.  The broker-dealer, Stanford Group Com-
pany (“SGC”), is a member of SIPC and the whole operation, with its 
lavish headquarters in Houston and offices around the world, appears per-
fectly prosperous.  Yet on February 17, 2009, you receive news that FBI 
agents have stormed SGC headquarters in an SEC investigation alleging 
fraud or even a Ponzi scheme at Stanford, and that the federal court for the 
Northern District of Texas has appointed a receiver, Dallas attorney Ralph 
Janvey, to clean up the growing insolvency mess.1  Most importantly, you 
discover that your SGC brokerage account with a New Jersey holding 
company has been frozen.2  Within days, the receiver hires an army of at-
torneys and accountants who all start billing their time to the receivership.3 
You, confused and worried by the affair, wonder what will happen next. 
 Within days, Janvey sends you a demand letter saying that he wants all 
of your Stanford investment money, both principal and interest, for a pool 
that will give all investors a low pro rata distribution.  You are stunned that 
the receiver would suggest that you simply hand over your contractual 
returns, especially since he is attempting to gain access to CD proceeds 
not only in your brokerage account, but also money sitting in your bank 
account, money that made your mortgage payments last year, and money 
that paid your daughter’s college tuition.  You storm to your SGC financial 
advisor to find out what he knows and to ask him why he allowed you to 
invest in a fraud.  He, who has also invested in the CD, tearfully promises 
that he knows nothing of the alleged fraud and says that the receiver plans 
to claw back all of his commissions, salary, and employee forgivable loans 
related to CD sales.4  He also tells you that the receiver has fired him and 
all other advisors.5  Worst of all, he says, the receiver plans to pursue 
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both investors and advisors as “relief defendants” — a classification that 
will largely prevent you from defending yourself, even though the receiver 
does not claim that you did anything wrong.6  Now, confused more than 
angry, you hasten immediately to your attorney.
 This ugly scene, slightly fictionalized, demonstrates the uncertainty 
facing innocent investors and employees in Ponzi schemes and other in-
vestment fraud cleanups.7  Most starkly displayed in the $8 billion Stan-
ford matter, the idea of treating investors and employees as though they 
had no legitimate claim to their funds has been around for some time. 
Conversation on this issue has spread on news sites and through the blogo-
sphere, but there is a surprising lack of academic literature examining the 
pros and cons of what seems at times to be either self-serving or capricious 
receiver action.  This article clarifies and directs the conversation and will 
help prevent abuse of investors and employees in the future.  The article 
begins with an introduction to and brief history of relief defendants — 
nominal parties who hold receivership funds but have no legitimate claim 
to them — in investment frauds.  
 Though the relief defendant concept is becoming well-known, it has 
been a contested legal concept for decades in fraud cleanups.  Indeed, 
receivers, trustees, and judges have diverse opinions on whether inves-
tors and employees should ever be proper relief defendants and, if so, 
the amount of investment proceeds a receiver can claw back from them.8 
Thus, the law of relief defendants is economically inefficient because it is 
unpredictable.  Some problematic reasoning has already led to harsh out-
comes for two of the most attractive clawback targets for receivers clean-
ing up financial frauds: investors and employees.  In particular, the follow-
ing should be antithetical to the law of relief defendants: (1) that investors, 
as relief defendants, can be made to disgorge the amount of principal they 
invested;9 and (2) that employees, as relief defendants, can be made to 
disgorge their reasonable remuneration.  
 The basis of these problems is a misunderstanding or misconstruction 
of “legitimate claim or ownership interest,” which is the key to determin-
ing whether a party is a proper relief defendant or must be pursued as a 
“full defendant,” that is, as a party whose unjust enrichment, receipt of a 
fraudulent conveyance, or other participation in or benefit from the fraud 
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allows for a cause of action (with its panoply of defenses) against her.  This 
article next introduces these two problems by way of a few salient cases. 
After each problem, the obvious solution is discussed: to reinforce the idea 
that investors have a legitimate claim to their principal and that employees 
have a legitimate claim to their reasonable remuneration — even in Ponzi 
schemes.  Clarification of the status of investors and employees will not 
only minimize economic hardship on innocent parties, but will also reduce 
the time that receivers (and defense attorneys) spend litigating, thereby 
leaving more of the receivership estate for distribution to creditors.  
 The legal problems then are illustrated, where the Stanford case is 
used to display the consequences of disregarding the plain meaning of 
“legitimate claim or ownership interest.”  In that case, the receiver and his 
contingent of professional billers burned through money meant for inves-
tors and other creditors while fruitlessly pursuing other innocent inves-
tors and employees as relief defendants.  If the relief defendant concept 
had been clearer, this likely would not have happened.  Adhering to the 
plain definition of “legitimate claim” will lead to predictability and ef-
ficiency by discouraging unnecessary litigation, maintaining the size of 
the receivership estate, and providing for an earlier distribution of receiv-
ership funds to creditors.  Receivers, incentivized by the pool of money 
sitting in receivership, will probably continue to push the envelope even 
after these particular problems are finally settled, but perhaps by helping 
to focus the discussion surrounding relief defendants in investment frauds, 
investors and employees will be saved from needless and costly attacks by 
misguided receivers.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELIEF DEFENDANTS IN INVESTMENT 
FRAUD RECEIVERSHIPS
 A federal receivership in a securities fraud case is essentially the eq-
uity-based version of a bankruptcy trusteeship.10  That is, the receiver, ap-
pointed as an officer of the court,11 steps into the shoes of the directors and 
managers of the accused entity for the benefit of creditors — who begin 
to queue shortly after the receiver’s appointment.  Rather than the web of 
bankruptcy code rules governing trustee behavior, receivers are governed 
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by broad equitable principles as defined in the receiver’s appointment or-
der.  Indeed, the need for equity and flexibility is identified in Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 66, which states that: 
 These rules govern an action in which the appointment of a receiver is 
sought or a receiver sues or is sued.  But the practice in administering 
an estate by a receiver or a similar court-appointed officer must accord 
with the historical practice in federal courts or with a local rule.  An 
action in which a receiver has been appointed may be dismissed only 
by court order.  
By handing decision-making in administration of the entity in receivership 
to courts following the “historical practice” of other courts, the drafters of 
the Federal Rules recognized the need to leave this area to case-by-case 
analysis and common law development.  Although the common law does 
structure receivership dealings and precedent is important, “The district 
court has broad powers and wide discretion to determine relief in an equity 
receivership.”12
 The principles governing equity receivers are usually reflected in the 
receiver’s appointment order by the trial court handling the enforcement 
matter.13  Ordinarily, appointment orders broadly state that the receiver’s 
duty is to retain and recover assets of the entity in receivership for the 
benefit of the creditors of that entity.14  
Relief Defendants
 Relief defendants are “part[ies] to an action who ha[ve] no control 
over it and no financial interest in its outcome….”15  Since relief defen-
dants, mere custodians or gratuitous recipients of funds, have no stake 
in the outcome and are accused of no wrongdoing or unjust enrichment, 
receivers can, by summary judgment, disgorge funds from them without 
asserting a cause of action as long as the relief defendants cannot show a 
legitimate claim to the funds. 
 By contrast, full defendants are parties who must be given full service 
of process, pursued under some cognizable cause of action, and must be 
afforded the ability to fully litigate his liability under that cause of action.16 
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Naming a party as a relief defendant cannot be used as a quick way of ob-
taining disgorgement from a party if that party has an interest in the funds 
or is a wrongdoer; such parties do not fit the definition of a relief defendant 
and must be pursued as full defendants under some cause of action that 
affords full defensive rights.17 
 In the receivership context, the procedural tool known as a “relief” or 
“nominal” defendant is one who:
 [H]as no ownership interest in the property that is the subject of liti-
gation but may be joined in the lawsuit to aid the recovery of relief. 
A relief defendant is not accused of wrongdoing, but a federal court 
may order equitable relief against such a person where that person 
(1) has received ill-gotten funds, and (2) does not have a legitimate 
claim to those funds….  A “nominal defendant” is a person who can be 
joined to aid the recovery of relief without an additional assertion of 
subject matter jurisdiction only because he has no ownership interest 
in the property which is the subject of litigation.  Because a nominal 
defendant has no ownership interest in the funds at issue, once the 
district court has acquired subject matter jurisdiction over the litiga-
tion regarding the conduct that produced the funds, it is not necessary 
for the court to separately obtain subject matter jurisdiction over the 
claim to the funds held by the nominal defendant; rather, the nominal 
defendant is joined purely as a means of facilitating collection.  In 
short, a nominal defendant is part of a suit only as the holder of assets 
that must be recovered in order to afford complete relief; no cause of 
action is asserted against a nominal defendant.18
 Often — and particularly when there are many relief defendants — the 
court will institute summary proceedings to decide whether the relief defen-
dants have a legitimate claim to the funds they hold and, if they do not, to 
quickly disgorge the funds.19 There is no need for relief defendants to show 
exclusive ownership of the disputed funds to avoid disgorgement; they must 
generally show only some legitimate claim or ownership interest (beyond 
mere possession) to prevent summary disgorgement.20  In plain language, 
a “legitimate claim” is merely “any right to payment… even if contingent 
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or provisional” that is lawful, genuine, or valid;21 an ownership “interest” is 
simply a “legal share in [ownership]; all or part of a legal or equitable claim 
to or right in property.”22  An innocent employee who earns remuneration 
and can show that the remuneration is reasonable — that is, that the payment 
does not so far outweigh services rendered so as to become a gift or mere 
transfer of funds — clearly has a legitimate claim, arising out of the em-
ployment relationship, to the compensation.  Likewise, an innocent investor 
always has a legitimate claim to investment returns up to the amount of her 
principal invested, and, in many situations — such as when debt holders are 
contractually promised a fixed rate of return — investors must be seen to 
have a legitimate claim to interest as well.  
 The quintessential relief defendant is a bank or a trustee holding funds 
on behalf of others, the addition of whom as a nominal party has no effect 
on jurisdiction.23  For example, in SEC v. Absolutefuture.com,24 defendants, 
after acquiring funds fraudulently, placed those funds into an account with 
relief defendant Exchange Bank & Trust, Inc.  Since the relief defendant 
was merely holding funds that, for its purposes, belonged to someone else, 
it had no legitimate claim or ownership interest in them.  
 The relief defendant concept, though very simple on its face, has not 
had much time to develop, so it is perhaps understandable that the courts 
have varied so widely in its application.  True, the SEC began using the 
nominal defendant concept in a limited way decades ago, using it as a 
tactic to add a needed party, such as the corporation itself, which would 
often align itself with the SEC’s position.25  Today, however, relief defen-
dants are used in cases initiated by the SEC, CFTC, and other agencies as 
a means of quickly obtaining funds that belong to the receivership but are 
being held by someone else in a merely custodial or possessory capacity.26 
Reaching this point, which is still unstable, has taken time.  One major 
turning point was SEC v. Cherif, which demonstrated that the stage was set 
by 1991 to use the relief defendant tool not just as a means of adding enti-
ties as procedurally nominal parties but for clawbacks against individuals 
who had received funds originally obtained by fraud.27 The court in Cherif, 
faced with a nominal defendant who might well have provided services in 
return for compensation, inadvertently gave birth to confusion, and parties 
on both sides of the debate on the breadth of the relief defendant tool use 
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Cherif to bolster their position.
 In that case, defendant Danny Cherif, an ex-employee of a Chicago 
bank, used his still-functional employee magnetic identification card to 
enter the firm’s building outside working hours, obtain confidential infor-
mation about the bank’s corporate clients, and then trade on the stock mar-
ket using that information before it went public.28 As part of his scheme, 
he opened a brokerage account in the name of his brother-in-law, nominal 
defendant Khaled Sanchou.  The SEC obtained a preliminary freeze on the 
account and sought to disgorge any money from it that was connected to 
Cherif’s fraud.29 Sanchou argued that the freeze must be lifted because the 
district court had no jurisdiction over him.  The Seventh Circuit held that 
subject matter jurisdiction would not be a problem for the SEC if Sanchou 
truly was a nominal defendant:30 
 Because the nominal defendant is a “trustee, agent, or depositary,” 
who has possession of the funds which are the subject of litigation, he 
must often be joined purely as a means of facilitating collection.  The 
court needs to order the nominal defendant to turn over funds to the 
prevailing party when the dispute between the parties is resolved.  A 
nominal defendant is not a real party in interest, however, because he 
has no interest in the subject matter litigated.  His relation to the suit 
is merely incidental and “it is of no moment [to him] whether the one 
or the other side in [the] controversy succeed[s].”  Because of the non-
interested status of the nominal defendant, there is no claim against 
him and it is unnecessary to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over 
him once jurisdiction over the defendant is established.31
 Noting that the factual record was insufficient to conclude that San-
chou had no hand in the scheme or otherwise was an uninterested party, 
the Court remanded and said that the district court should come to one of 
two conclusions: either that (1) Sanchou was an innocent custodian of the 
funds, in which case he would be a proper relief defendant and subject 
matter jurisdiction would be irrelevant; or that (2) Sanchou had a hand 
in Cherif’s scheme, and the preliminary freeze would have to be vacated, 
after which the SEC could amend its complaint to state a claim directly 
RELIEF DEFENDANTS IN INVESTMENT FRAUD RECEIVERSHIPS
251
against Sanchou and freeze the account again as it sought relief.32  Thus, 
the court assumed that Sanchou either had no legitimate claim to the funds 
or that he was a wrongdoer.
 The problem with Cherif is the Seventh Circuit’s willingness to have 
the lower court apply the relief defendant label to Sanchou, who may have 
been — rather than an innocent party with no claim to the funds — an in-
vestor or an employee with an ownership interest in the funds in his broker-
age account.  He could have both had a legitimate claim to the funds and 
been innocent.  That is, Sanchou may have had an innocent agreement with 
Cherif to receive a portion of the trading proceeds in return for Cherif’s use 
of Sanchou’s name and his account — or he may have had a similar agree-
ment to receive a salary in return for the service he was providing Cherif. 
Thus, Sanchou could have been an investor, an employee, or something be-
tween the two.  The court, however, did not attempt to resolve this problem 
and thus left the relief defendant concept open to interpretation.  The Sev-
enth Circuit’s willingness to instruct the district court to add Sanchou as a 
nominal defendant without analyzing whether he had a legitimate claim to 
the funds made Cherif a ripe candidate for both attackers and defenders of 
innocent investors and employees in financial frauds.  
 Consequently, after Cherif, the relief defendant concept received fur-
ther analysis, but what constituted a legitimate claim remained, and still 
remains, vague.  Courts thus far addressing the issue agree on one thing: 
the definition of a relief defendant is a party against whom no wrongdoing 
is alleged but who holds receivership funds to which she has no legitimate 
claim or ownership interest.33  Thus, courts agree that relief defendants can 
only avoid disgorgement by summary judgment by showing a legitimate 
claim or ownership interest in the funds they hold.34  However, despite 
these basic agreements, interpretations still conflict.  As shown below, the 
entire controversy revolves around the meaning of “legitimate claim or 
ownership interest.” If courts bend the meaning of these plain words, they 
can — and have — come to diverse and, importantly, unpredictable out-
comes.  Settling this meaning will mean less confusion, less litigation, less 
money in the receiver’s pocket and more in investors’ hands.
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DEFINING “LEGITIMATE CLAIM OR OWNERSHIP INTEREST” 
FOR INVESTORS AND EMPLOYEES
 Cherif, in addition to the flexible nature of equity decisions,35 kept the 
door open for divergent views on how investors and employees should be 
treated when added as relief defendants.  Some courts, such as the Sixth 
Circuit in SEC v. George,36 have inappropriately found that investors do 
not have a legitimate claim or ownership interest in, at a minimum, the 
amount of their principal investment.37  Other courts, acknowledging the 
plain meaning of “legitimate claim or ownership interest,” protect, at min-
imum, investors’ principal.38 
 Likewise, some courts addressing employees as relief defendants 
summarily, and improperly, order disgorgement of the employees’ funds 
even though, as relief defendants, no wrongdoing is alleged against them. 
Other courts recognize that innocent employees have acquired a legitimate 
claim by providing services in return for compensation.39  The uncertain-
ty for investors and employees added as relief defendants in investment 
frauds needs to be leveled by more authority in favor of the clear meaning 
of “legitimate claim or ownership interest.”  The cost stemming from such 
uncertainty, as shown below, can be devastating to relief defendants.
Investors as Relief Defendants
 The most important case holding that investor relief defendants are 
subject to summary disgorgement of both principal and interest is SEC 
v. George.40  There, Steven Thorn, Derrick McKinney, and Rick Malizia 
solicited 550 investors for what they advertised as secretive “European 
fixed-instrument securities, including medium term notes.”41  The inves-
tors were told that their investment would be pooled with others’ to reach 
threshold levels for preferred rates of return.  In reality, no investment 
occurred and Thorn, McKinney, and Malizia pooled the money to pay 
monthly “returns” to investors and make lavish personal purchases for 
themselves.42  In short, it was a Ponzi scheme.  
 In addition to claims against Thorn, McKinney, and Malizia, the re-
ceiver sought summary judgment — in the form of clawbacks — against 
investor relief defendants.43  The receiver pursued investors for principal, 
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“interest” earned on the investments, and prejudgment interest in an at-
tempt to gather receivership funds and distribute them on a pro-rata basis. 
The Southern District of Ohio agreed with the receiver that, even though 
no wrongdoing was alleged against them, the investor relief defendants 
had (1) obtained receivership funds to which (2) they had no legitimate 
claim.  The court granted summary judgment to the SEC.44 Four of these 
relief defendants — Durietha Dziorney, Carl Jackson, Frederick Harris 
and Allen George — argued that they had a legitimate claim to the funds 
they received from the scheme.  
 Dziorney was Thorn’s fiancée during the scheme, but she, rather than 
investing, simply received nearly $100,000 in cash and gifts (including a 
$66,000 engagement ring) from Thorn’s pool of investor money;45 her argu-
ments of legitimate claim were rightly rejected and the district court ordered 
her to disgorge the funds.46  Jackson, Harris, and George were each innocent 
investors, against whom no wrongdoing or complicity was alleged, whose 
investment proceeds (plus prejudgment interest) were clawed back.  Jack-
son had invested $285,000 in the notes and received only $282,320 back. 
Although he was a “net loser,” the district court ordered him to disgorge 
the full $282,320 plus $70,721 in prejudgment interest.47  Harris, also a net 
loser, had invested $1,186,000 and received only $505,920 in return; the 
district court ordered him to disgorge the full $505,920 plus $139,867 in 
prejudgment interest.48  Finally, George, a net winner, had invested $37,000 
and received $79,300 in return; the district court ordered him to disgorge the 
$79,300 plus $13,495 in prejudgment interest.49 
 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the question for all four relief defen-
dants was whether they had established a legitimate claim to the funds.50 
No court has held that a gift gives rise to a legitimate claim, and Dzironey 
was properly made to disgorge her gifts.  However, the Sixth Circuit was 
incorrect as to the three investor relief defendants.  To order the three in-
nocent investors to disgorge everything related to the investment scheme, 
plus prejudgment interest, the court had to ignore the plain meaning of “le-
gitimate claim or ownership interest,” the definition of which must include 
contractual returns on debt.51 
 After giving token recognition to the standard relief defendant defini-
tion by quoting Cherif and other cases, the Sixth Circuit stated that, “Each 
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of the relief defendants in this instance received ill-gotten funds and had 
no legitimate claim to those funds.”52  The court then said, “Jackson, Har-
ris and George [ ] received ill-gotten funds from the defendants.  While 
each of the three invested his own money in Thorn’s investment scheme, 
the SEC showed that the money they received from the scheme came not 
from profits on their investments but from the investments of others.”53 
This focus on tracing scrambled the plain meaning of “legitimate claim.”
 Tracing one’s profits to one’s principal has never been necessary to 
establish ownership over investment proceeds, and such a requirement is 
unforeseen and onerous from an investor’s view.  Yet tracing was the only 
method, in the Sixth Circuit’s eyes, by which the investors could have es-
tablished a legitimate claim:54 “[Jackson, Harris, and George] failed to come 
forward with any evidence rebutting the SEC’s tracing evidence.  To survive 
summary judgment in the face of the SEC’s evidence, the relief defendants 
needed to present affirmative evidence, not just affirmative assertions, dem-
onstrating a disputed issue of material fact.  They did not do so.”55  Thus, the 
investors — two of whom received less than their principal investment — 
had to disgorge every penny, plus interest, that they had received according 
to contractual agreement, even though no wrongdoing was alleged against 
them.  Thus, the court suggested that an investor may not have a legitimate 
claim to the amount of his own investment and that, even in the absence of 
wrongdoing, an investor can only prove a legitimate claim by tracing the 
dollars he received from the scheme to the dollars he placed into the scheme. 
 This obvious misuse of the relief defendant tool came in the misguided 
pursuit of equity.  The Sixth Circuit, like the district court, wanted every 
creditor to receive 42 percent of their principal in accordance with the re-
ceiver’s distribution plan.56  Indeed, the court mandated total disgorgement 
even though it knew that Thorn had told potential investors before they in-
vested that their money would be pooled with that of other investors in order 
to reach optimal, threshold levels of investment.57  Thus, investors knew 
from the outset — and the court knew before writing its opinion — that the 
money would be pooled and would not be traceable by investors.  The court 
used traceability as the only factor determining whether an investor had a 
legitimate claim even though it knew that not a single investor could avoid 
disgorgement by tracing payout to principal.  Thus, against plain meaning, 
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the court turned the expansive “legitimate claim or ownership interest” eval-
uation into a single-prong test for tracing.  This move has helped keep the 
meaning of legitimate claim or ownership interest cloudy.
Protecting Investors
 Investor relief defendants should be protected by courts’ recognition that 
innocent investors have a per se legitimate claim to their investment proceeds 
— at a minimum, the amount of principal invested.  Probably the most im-
portant counterweight to George’s authority on this issue is Janvey v. Adams, 
which is addressed below.  However, other courts have also adhered to the 
plain meaning of “legitimate claim or ownership interest,” finding that inves-
tors have a legitimate claim to funds stemming from their investments.  For 
example, in FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc.,58 the court held that Lisa 
Mount, an investor and former employee of one of the companies in receiv-
ership, had to be protected from disgorgement.  The corporation, which was 
allegedly used as part of a fraudulent infomercial scheme, made distributions 
to Mount, but there was no evidence that the distribution was anything but 
a legitimate return on her investment in the corporation.59  Thus, the funds 
could not be disgorged since there was significant doubt regarding the na-
ture of the distribution.  In this instance, the court properly recognized that, 
since there was a strong possibility that the distribution was not just a gift or 
siphoning of funds, Mount, as an investor, should be protected.
 Other courts have similarly held, even in the context of full defen-
dants against whom causes of action are asserted, that otherwise innocent 
investors have a claim to investment funds.60 For example, in Johnson v. 
Studholme, the receiver claimed, among other things, that the investors in 
a Ponzi scheme investigated by the CFTC had not given value for their 
returns on investment.  The court disagreed, finding that the investors had 
given value for their entire returns: 
 There was…no allegation that the defendants received these payments 
with anything less than a good faith belief that it was a legitimate re-
turn on their investment as part of a contractual relationship….  The 
plaintiffs’ contention that the defendants were not purchasers for value 
is…wrong because the value given by the investors was, of course, 
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their contributions and the risk that they may lose all or part of their 
investment….  While the scheme may have been illegal, from an eco-
nomic perspective there is no doubt that the innocent investors gave 
value.  They did all that was asked of them in the representations 
which induced their investment.61 
 In Chosnek v. Rolley the receiver attempted to claw back investors’ re-
turns on the theory of unjust enrichment, but the court protected investors’ 
principal: “[A]n innocent investor in a Ponzi scheme is not unjustly enriched 
when he receives returns on his investment in good faith and while ignorant 
of the scheme, so long as the returns do not exceed the amount of the original 
investment.  To the extent of the original investment, such are not subject to 
claims made by later investors on the theory of unjust enrichment.”62  Even 
though the theories against them are similar, the legitimate claim require-
ment should be more easily met for relief defendants than full defendants 
being pursued under unjust enrichment or fraudulent transfer claims, since 
relief defendants are usually defrauded already and they are not allowed full 
defensive protections.  As the Eleventh Circuit noted, “It would be difficult 
for equity to permit the Receiver to bring money into the receivership from 
someone who was defrauded…. In effect, equity would be sanctioning fur-
ther torment of a defrauded investor.”63
Employees as Relief Defendants
 To demonstrate the arguments made when receivers or agencies at-
tempt to claw back funds from employees, SEC v. Infinity Group64 and 
SEC v. Amerifirst Funding65 are examined.  As with the investor context, 
problems have arisen in the employee-as-relief-defendant context when 
courts do not recognize that workers have a legitimate claim to the com-
pensation they earn in return for services.  
SEC v. Infinity Group
 In Infinity Group, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania started on the 
right foot: with the proper definition of a relief defendant.66 However, it 
refused to acknowledge that the principal’s wife, Susan Benson, had any 
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legitimate claim to the funds she held and presumably worked for.67 To 
reach this point, the court recognized that Mrs. Benson may have worked 
for the funds, but stated that, “[T]o the extent Susan Benson earned any of 
the funds which were transferred into these trusts, she did so in the service 
of the very unlawful offering and sale of securities which is the subject 
of these proceedings.  It would be contrary to the securities law to allow 
Mrs. Benson to launder the proceeds of a securities fraud by billing bilked 
investors for services rendered in furtherance of that fraud.  Illegal con-
sideration is invalid consideration and thus cannot shield ill-gotten gains 
from disgorgement.”68
 Although the court likely arrived at the correct outcome (Mrs. Benson 
probably was a wrongdoer or co-conspirator), it did so by misapplying its 
own definition of relief defendant in two ways: first, Mrs. Benson stated 
a legitimate claim to the funds; second, the court imputed wrongdoing to 
her.  Either of these misapplications should be enough to place a party 
outside the relief defendant realm, and the Infinity Group court created 
enormous uncertainty by overlooking its two obvious missteps.  If Mrs. 
Benson worked for the money, which the court seemed willing to accept, 
she had stated a legitimate claim.  Further, there is no question that the 
court considered Mrs. Benson to be a wrongdoer — indeed, a launderer. 
However, a relief defendant is, by definition, accused of no wrongdoing. 
Since Mrs. Benson convinced the court that she might have worked for 
the funds, she should have been released as a relief defendant and pursued 
as a full defendant with full defensive rights, rather than being summarily 
deprived of her assets.  The court overlooked a legitimate claim — which 
Mrs. Benson articulated — in favor of potential wrongdoing, thereby 
muddling the relief defendant concept and keeping the door wide open for 
suits against employees. 
 In addition to confusing a legitimate claim with wrongdoing, the Infin-
ity Group court created an untenable standard for summary disgorgement: 
if a person has been “in the service of the very unlawful offering and sale 
of securities which is the subject of [the] proceedings,” she has no legiti-
mate claim to the funds she holds.  Presumably, this broad definition could 
be applied to anyone who supports an unlawful offering, whether they 
know the offering is unlawful or not.  Under this standard, everyone from 
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officers and directors to gardeners and janitors could be subject to sum-
mary disgorgement.
SEC v. Amerifirst Funding
 In Amerifirst Funding, Jeffrey Bruteyn and others orchestrated an in-
vestment fraud through closely-held, affiliated corporations.69  Hess Fi-
nancial was one of these corporations, and it provided consulting services 
to Bruteyn’s Amerifirst Group, which was in receivership.  Hess was add-
ed as a relief defendant, with the SEC seeking to disgorge any money that 
Bruteyn had fraudulently obtained and then used to pay for consultations.70 
The district court for the Northern District of Texas issued a default judg-
ment against Hess, and in the later disgorgement quantification order, the 
court explained its reason for complying with the SEC’s wishes: “Because 
(1) the AmeriFirst entities paid Hess Financial with ill-gotten funds from 
investors who purchased the illegal SDOs [(self-directed investment op-
tions)] and (2) Hess Financial does not have a legitimate claim to these 
funds, Hess Financial should disgorge the ‘consulting fees’ it received 
from the AmeriFirst entities.  Although Hess Financial might have had a 
legitimate claim to ‘consulting fees’ had it been unaware that its consulting 
services were furthering securities fraud, Hess Financial cannot invoke a 
good faith defense because its head, Bruteyn, was a principal actor in the 
securities fraud scheme.”71
 As with Infinity Group, the court almost undoubtedly arrived at the 
correct outcome — that is, since Bruteyn headed Hess, the corporation 
could be imbued with knowledge of the investment fraud.  However, in 
arriving there, the court misapplied the relief defendant tool.  The court 
recognized that the consulting services provided, and the fees charged, 
to Amerifirst could have been legitimate and reasonable.72  Yet the court 
moved on to say that Hess was a knowing participant in the fraud, and that 
it could therefore not use a “good faith defense” — something reserved 
only for full defendants, as in a fraudulent transfer action where the defen-
dant must prove not simply a legitimate claim but good faith and value.73 
 Wrongdoers cannot be relief defendants, as the court noted in its own 
definition: “[T]he SEC may seek disgorgement from ‘nominal’ or ‘relief’ 
defendants who are not themselves accused of wrongdoing in a securi-
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ties enforcement action where those persons or entities (1) have received 
ill-gotten funds, and (2) do not have a legitimate claim to those funds.”74 
Even though the court properly recognized this definition, it treated Hess 
as both a relief defendant and a wrongdoer — a move that is clearly incor-
rect and one that leads to confusion.  If the court saw that Hess, know-
ing of Bruteyn’s fraud, had rendered services for payment, it should have 
dismissed him as a relief defendant since he had a legitimate claim to 
the funds he held; the SEC could then have pursued Hess as a full defen-
dant and wrongdoer.  There are many doctrines under which Hess could 
have been pursued as a full defendant, including fraudulent transfer, unjust 
enrichment, or even violation of the securities laws.  Instead, the court 
blended wrongdoing with the relief defendant tool.  This blending keeps 
the door open for error and — the ultimate harbinger of economic waste-
fulness — uncertainty.  Even if the court arrived at the correct result, it 
confused the relief defendant concept — inviting future litigation based on 
doubt that any particular relief defendant actually has a legitimate claim to 
the funds she holds.  
Protecting Employees 
 Innocent employees have a legitimate claim to the funds distributed to 
them in return for their services.  Although cases like Infinity Group and 
Amerifirst are establishing precedent against this proposition, others rec-
ognize this solid, predictable principle.  More authority is needed to firmly 
establish it.
 Ross is a very strong case for the plain meaning of “legitimate claim 
or ownership interest” for employees because it explicitly instructs regula-
tory agencies and receivers to avoid what likely was done in Infinity Group 
and Amerifirst Funding, viz. finding no legitimate claim because the relief 
defendant might be a wrongdoer.75  In Ross, relief defendant Ernest Bus-
tos, an ex-salesman of the entity in receivership (a company selling inter-
ests in payphones), appealed an order from the District of Oregon that he 
disgorge all of his commission payments.76 
 The Ninth Circuit first noted that summary proceedings against re-
lief defendants — including low standards for service of process and es-
tablishing personal jurisdiction, and summary disgorgement if there is no 
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showing of a legitimate claim to the funds — were fair and helpful in 
marshaling the assets of a receivership, but only as long as those pursued 
fell cleanly into the definition of a relief defendant.77 The court noted that 
Bustos clearly had a legitimate claim to the funds: “Bustos appears to be 
no different from any other employee or vendor: he received compensa-
tion in return for services rendered.  As such, he has presumptive title 
to those commissions, and unless the Receiver can prove otherwise, it is 
likely that the Receiver can disgorge those commissions only by showing 
that Bustos has himself violated the securities laws.”78
 After establishing that Bustos was not a proper relief defendant be-
cause he had a legitimate claim to the funds, the court went on to reprove 
the receiver and the SEC for suggesting that Bustos should disgorge his 
commissions because he was a wrongdoer in the fraud.79  Noting that the 
SEC had many options by which to pursue wrongdoers and that relief 
defendant disgorgement was not one of them in this instance, the court 
said, “However the Receiver or the SEC chooses to proceed, we admonish 
both to avoid improper shortcuts.  Unless they can articulate some theory 
of liability that does not turn on Bustos’s own violation of the securities 
laws, they must formally serve him with process, properly obtain in perso-
nam jurisdiction over him, permit him to litigate fully all issues relating to 
both the fact and scope of his liability, and do so, of course, subject to all 
available legal and equitable defenses.”80 
 Thus, the court recognized that the SEC had violated two of the facets 
of the relief defendant definition: that a relief defendant has no legitimate 
claim to the funds and that a relief defendant is not a wrongdoer.  The 
court did not, as others have done, mix the concepts of legitimate claim 
with wrongdoing, noting instead that a wrongdoer has the right to the due 
process and defensive mechanisms offered to all full, or primary, defen-
dants.81  Thus, Ross is a major piece of the firewall being built up against 
cases like George, Infinity Group, and Amerifirst Funding.  By follow-
ing the reasoning in Ross, other courts would not only recognize that em-
ployees have a legitimate claim to their remuneration, but also that such 
employees, if wrongdoers, have to be pursued as full defendants with the 
ability to defend themselves.
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CFTC v. Walsh: A Template for Reasonably Deciding the Legitimate 
Claim Question in Any Context
 General principles should apply whenever a court is deciding whether 
a relief defendant has a legitimate claim to the funds at issue.  CFTC v. 
Walsh is among the best examples of a court’s grappling with the plain 
meaning of “legitimate claim.”82  There, Ms. Schaberg, the wife of the 
supposed fraudster Walsh, was added as a relief defendant in a case by the 
SEC and CFTC against her husband and his business partner.83  The funds 
and luxury items the SEC and CFTC sought from Schaberg were trace-
able to Walsh’s misappropriation of his clients’ funds, but Schaberg had 
acquired them in a divorce settlement agreement from Walsh some three 
years before the SEC and CFTC brought suit against him.84  The question, 
therefore, was whether Schaberg had acquired a legitimate claim to the 
funds by signing the settlement agreement in which, she argued, she gave 
up legal claims against her husband in return for the assets.85 
 The court admitted that it had never constructed guidelines on what 
constitutes a legitimate claim or ownership interest.86  Attempting to form 
a baseline, it accepted the notion that if Ms. Schaberg could establish that 
the foregoing of her legal claims was in good faith and valuable,87 then 
her assets would be protected from disgorgement — at least until she was 
pursued under some other theory.88 
 Ultimately, the court had to certify questions to the New York Court 
of Appeals rather than solve them itself since, taking the relief defendant 
concept seriously rather than imputing Schaberg with wrongdoing or other-
wise foregoing analysis, it recognized that the matters of value and property 
were state law questions for which it had no answer.89  Even though the 
court did not reach a final resolution, this case is a prime illustration of how 
courts should conscientiously approach the legitimate claim question: first, 
the court set reasonable parameters, based on other cases, as to what could 
be considered a legitimate claim under the plain meaning of that term.90  It 
recognized that, on one hand, gifts from a spouse — as in George — would 
not give rise to a legitimate claim while noting that, on the other hand, re-
ceiving compensation for services rendered to an employer or purchasing 
assets for value would give rise to such a claim.  Second, after setting these 
parameters, the court did not avoid the meaning of a legitimate claim by 
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imputing wrongdoing to the relief defendant or order disgorgement simply 
because the regulatory authority sought it.  Instead, it engaged in thought-
ful and serious analysis of what, under law and clear meaning, constitutes a 
legitimate claim.  Recognizing that it could not, even in equity, go further, it 
turned the questions over to the state court for help.91 
 As long as courts do not gloss over the meaning of “legitimate claim 
or ownership interest,” they will likely either come to a reasonable con-
clusion that stems from the words themselves and the legal standards they 
represent (as in Ross), or reach a point at which they can go no further (as 
in Walsh).  In the context of relief defendant employees and investors in 
fraudulent schemes, however, the way forward is clear in, almost certainly, 
every case: courts should find that remuneration and principal invested 
give rise to a legitimate claim.  If the parties then can be sued as full defen-
dants under fraudulent transfer, unjust enrichment, or fraud claims, then so 
be it, but a party holding remuneration for services or investment principal 
cannot be a proper relief defendant.  There can be no other reasonable 
reading of the agreed-upon language.
SEC V. STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK: AN ILLUSTRATION 
OF THE LEGITIMATE CLAIM CONFUSION AND ITS COSTS
 Receivers, who are officers of the court appointing them, exist to 
benefit investors and other creditors.92  Yet when receivers (or regulatory 
agencies, who are often the named plaintiffs in such suits) ignore the plain 
meaning of “legitimate claim or ownership interest” to pursue investors’ 
principal or employees’ remuneration by adding these parties as relief de-
fendants, problems arise.  If the receiver loses, he hurts creditors of the 
current receivership through misguided and wasteful litigation; if he wins, 
he hurts creditors of future receiverships by creating or perpetuating un-
certain definitions.  In litigation stemming from SEC v. Stanford Interna-
tional Bank,93 the receiver — relying on flawed precedent such as George 
— was ultimately prohibited from seeking disgorgement from investors 
as relief defendants.  This prohibition indicated to him that he would not 
prevail on relief defendant claims against employees, so he dropped those 
as well.  The case presents a perfect opportunity to illustrate the conse-
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quences, both in terms of legal arguments and practical, economic costs, 
of the uncertainty created by cases like George.  
Background and Law in Janvey v. Adams
 The Department of Justice, through a grand jury, indicted R. Allen 
Stanford (the sole shareholder and chairman of Stanford Financial Group, 
including Stanford International Bank) and his closest confidants and of-
ficers in June 2009 for violations of securities laws by running a massive 
Ponzi scheme.94  Ralph Janvey, the SEC-picked equity receiver of Stanford 
Group Company (a Houston-based broker-dealer subsidiary of Stanford 
Financial Group with its own subsidiary corporations)95 was appointed by 
the Northern District of Texas in February 2009.  The court directed him to 
recover traceable receivership assets for the benefit of investors and other 
creditors.96  Janvey immediately froze investors’ and employees’ broker-
age accounts and funds traceable to Stanford Financial Group in other 
places.97 He then fired the employees.98 
 Although the SEC v. Stanford family of cases (both the SEC and ancil-
lary suits) is large and growing, Janvey v. Adams is the most important re-
lief defendant battle of the group — and possibly the most important relief 
defendant case since George.  There, the receiver, in an action ancillary 
to the SEC suit, attempted to claw back investor relief defendants’ prin-
cipal and employee relief defendants’ compensation before the Northern 
District of Texas and, on appeal, before the Fifth Circuit.99  Only the issue 
of investor relief defendants was reached by the Fifth Circuit, although 
much of the same reasoning would apply to employee relief defendants, 
as Janvey recognized when, after the Fifth Circuit’s decision, he released 
the employees and re-added them as full defendants to be pursued under 
unjust enrichment and fraudulent transfer (“UFTA”) claims.100 
 The receiver’s freeze, which began in February 2009, ultimately en-
compassed some 32,000 accounts.101  After a few months, Judge Godbey 
of the Northern District of Texas recognized the freeze’s hardship on ac-
count holders, and ordered that the receiver either assert claims against 
holders or release their accounts by early August 2009.102  To keep their 
accounts frozen and hopefully claw back investment proceeds and remu-
neration, Janvey added as relief defendants hundreds of certificate of de-
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posit (“CD”) investors and ex-Stanford employees who had sold those 
CDs.103  In his complaints against them, the receiver sought not only the 
investors’ interest, but also their principal invested (even from numerous 
“net losers,” or those who received less in investment proceeds than they 
had invested in principal); from ex-financial advisors he sought base pay, 
commissions, bonuses, and employee-forgivable loans.104  He rested his 
complaints on the notion that the investors and former employees had no 
legitimate claim to any of these funds because they were simply lucky, not 
meritorious, to have received payments from other investors’ and creditors 
funds before the scheme crashed down.105 The court-appointed indepen-
dent examiner and the SEC itself quickly set themselves in opposition to 
Janvey’s attempts to disgorge so much from these already-harmed parties 
against whom no wrongdoing had been alleged.  In fact, the SEC even re-
quested that the receiver’s order be modified to disallow the receiver from 
pursuing clawbacks for investor’s principal.106  Despite firm opposition, 
Janvey plowed forward.107 
 Under a firestorm of arguments against Janvey’s continued freeze and 
questionable pursuit of relief defendants, the district court held a hear-
ing on July 31, 2009, in which the receiver, representatives of the relief 
defendants, the examiner, and the SEC all participated.108  The hearing’s 
main issue was the receiver’s motion to continue a freeze on hundreds of 
investor and employee relief defendants — including a freeze on many 
investors’ principal amounts received from Stanford.  During the hear-
ing, all parties (except the receiver) spoke against Janvey’s freeze on the 
investors’ principal, and argued that such funds should be released imme-
diately.  The SEC vociferously objected to Janvey’s actions, and Janvey 
himself stated that he had angered the SEC to such an extent by pursuing 
investors’ principal that he was certain never to be chosen as a federal 
equity receiver by the Commission again.109  When Judge Godbey issued 
his order, there were few surprises: he allowed the freeze to continue as to 
investors’ interest and he ordered release of investors’ principal amounts, 
but he stayed the release until August 13, 2009, to give the receiver an op-
portunity to seek from the Fifth Circuit an extension of the freeze pending 
appeal.110  Janvey received the extension,111 and the Fifth Circuit heard oral 
arguments on November 2.112
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 At the hearing, the receiver based his argument — that he should be 
allowed to seek complete disgorgement from investors as relief defendants 
for the purpose of an ultimate, pro rata distribution — on only two cases: 
George and CFTC v. Kimberlynn Creek Ranch.113  The court found neither 
of these cases helpful to the receiver and instead construed them to support 
its ultimate holding that Janvey could not pursue investors as relief defen-
dants at all.114  Indeed, the court actually determined that investors have 
a legitimate claim to all of their contractual investment proceeds — both 
principal and interest.115
 [T]he Receiver has failed to establish that the Investor Defendants lack 
a legitimate claim to the CD proceeds they received from the Stanford 
Bank.  They are therefore not proper relief defendants….   It is un-
disputed that the Investor Defendants received the CD proceeds pur-
suant to written certificate of deposit agreements with the Stanford 
Bank, which granted them certain rights and obligations.  There was a 
debtor-creditor relationship between the Investor Defendants and the 
Stanford Bank based on written agreements well before the underly-
ing SEC enforcement action against Stanford and the resulting receiv-
ership and restraining order.  This constitutes a sufficient legitimate 
ownership interest to preclude treating the Investor Defendants as re-
lief defendants….  Therefore, the Receiver’s claims and motions as to 
the Investor Defendants [regarding both principal and interest] should 
have been denied completely.116
 The court found a legitimate claim in the debtor-creditor relation-
ship, while quoting Kimberlynn Creek Ranch itself for another example: 
“[R]eceipt of funds as payment for services rendered to an employer con-
stitutes one type of ownership interest and would preclude proceeding 
against the holder of the funds as a nominal defendant.”117 
 No weight was given to whether payments to investors were traceable 
to each investor’s contribution.  In fact, interest from a Ponzi scheme can 
never come from one’s own investment.  Despite the obvious conflict with 
the Sixth Circuit’s definition of legitimate claim in George, which equated 
the term with tracing, the Adams court recognized no discrepancy between 
the two cases.  It cited George as being consistent with its own holding — 
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but only for the nominal definition of relief defendants as parties with no 
legitimate claim to the funds they hold, not for the interpretation of “legiti-
mate claim.”118  It is at that point that George and Adams diverge.  The two 
cases (and nearly all other relief defendant cases) recognize the definition 
of a relief defendant, but they differ markedly in what constitutes a legiti-
mate claim.  
 Commentators soon after Adams noted that the window of confusion 
had been left open.119  Still, the case is strong persuasive authority for the 
treatment of relief defendants in the future.  With any luck, courts will 
begin consistently recognizing that the relief defendant definition does not 
allow for recovery of investors’ principal (as held in Adams) or employees’ 
remuneration (as Janvey recognized soon after the Fifth Circuit decision 
when he released the financial advisors as relief defendants).
The Practical, Economic Cost of Confusion
 Janvey’s improper pursuit of relief defendants’ principal, though ulti-
mately unsuccessful, produced four hardships for creditors, most of whom 
were investors in the CD: first, it extended the litigation period for inves-
tors and financial advisors, placing a burden on them to stay engaged and 
pay attorneys’ fees; second, the freeze denied hundreds of investors access 
to their accounts for many months, thus imposing opportunity costs on 
account holders; third, the pursuit delayed ultimate relief for all creditors; 
fourth, by draining receivership funds and directing them to the receiver’s 
pocket, it decreased the amount that creditors could be paid back.  Inher-
ent to these hardships is a conflict of interest for receivers: their job is to 
capture as much of the receivership estate as possible for distribution to 
investors, but they know that the more litigation they spawn, the longer 
they will be paid out of the receivership itself.  Thus, in their zeal to recoup 
receivership assets, it may be easy for receivers to overlook the fact that, 
“To undo all of these transactions would cause incalculable harm to hun-
dreds of people, at a staggering cost, for which no commensurate benefit 
would lie.”120  The purpose in illustrating these four issues is to give an 
idea of how much time and money could be saved in a case like Adams if 
receivers and courts adhered to the plain meaning of “legitimate claim or 
ownership interest.”
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The First Problem: Extended Litigation
 Extended, unnecessary litigation is an enormous financial hardship for 
investors who have already been defrauded.  This financial hardship oc-
curs in at least two forms: opportunity cost for time spent on one’s own 
defense, and direct cost paid to one’s attorney.
 For months, Janvey and his team chased relief defendants who turned 
out to be improperly pursued.  These months represent lost time for the 
relief defendants as well as lost money flowing to their defense attorneys. 
That is, investors not only lost promised proceeds from their investment; 
they also lost legal fees.  This problem is especially acute with regard to 
net losers.  These people are by definition already harmed by the fraud 
and should not be defending themselves at all unless they are wrongdoers 
themselves.  Just as the Sixth Circuit should have recognized of Jackson 
and Harris in George, the net losers in Adams had a legitimate claim to 
what little amount was held in their accounts; they should not have been 
drained of even more money by paying attorneys’ fees and losing work 
hours while defending against the receiver’s attacks.  But litigation was 
needlessly extended even for net winners and employees in the Stanford 
case — for many, from April until November 2009.  
 Although no data exist to precisely quantify these losses, according to 
the Examiner, Janvey was pursuing 913 relief defendants (investors and 
employees) when the Fifth Circuit ruled against him on November 13, 
2009.121  Since many relief defendants found relatively low fees by join-
ing a group headed by one attorney,122 a mean low of $1,000 and a mean 
high of $2,000 per relief defendant is a very conservative but plausible 
estimate for the legal work undertaken for months on their behalf.  As for 
opportunity cost, this article conservatively estimates a mean low of 30 
working hours lost (almost two hours per week for those pursued from late 
July to November 13)123 and a mean high of 40 working hours lost (ap-
proximately two-and-a-half hours per week), at a low estimated mean rate 
of $40 per hour and a high mean of $50 per hour.  This is in view of the 
fact that most relief defendants were officially pursued as such from July 
28 to November 13 — even though the brokerage accounts of most added 
as relief defendants on July 28 had been frozen since February and they 
had been consulting with their attorneys well before being added to the 
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suit.  Using these very conservative numbers, it is estimated that the relief 
defendants lost between $913,000 and $1,826,000 in attorneys’ fees, and 
between $1,095,600 and $1,826,000 in opportunity cost, for a total loss of 
$2,008,600–$3,652,000.  
 These rough estimates demonstrate the cost, however well-meaning, 
imposed by the receiver on those he was meant to serve.  Of course, the 
fact that the receiver was seeking considerably more from relief defen-
dants for pro rata distribution than the few million dollars his actions di-
rectly cost them shows that his approach was not completely devoid of 
cost-benefit analysis.124 The point is that an understanding of the plain 
definition “relief defendant” likely would have saved investors and em-
ployees millions of dollars in attorneys’ fees and opportunity cost alone. 
That is, if Janvey could not have so easily molded the relief defendant 
concept into a George-esque argument, he probably would not have taken 
that losing stance in the first place.
The Second Problem: Account Freezes
 In an account freeze that often accompanies an SEC investigation, 
those with frozen accounts lose two sources of value: first, they cannot, as 
they would normally, use their accounts to participate in the investments 
of their choosing because the funds in the account remain in indefinite 
limbo; second, since the funds cannot be invested, investors cannot use 
the funds themselves or lost investment proceeds for wealth accumulation 
or living expenses — indeed, some people (imprudently, perhaps) live day 
to day on their brokerage accounts and investment proceeds and are finan-
cially crippled by a freeze.125 
 In February 2009, the court initially froze about 32,000 brokerage ac-
counts with possible connections to the certificate of deposit, representing 
approximately $6 billion in assets; since one of the Stanford entities — Stan-
ford Group Company, the Houston-based umbrella entity for which Janvey 
was receiver — was a registered broker-dealer, many of the accounts were 
trading accounts that had nothing to do with the CD under investigation.126 
Thus, after sorting them, Janvey began requesting release of mutual fund 
accounts as well as those under $250,000 not tied to the apparent fraud.127 
Later, Janvey requested release of thousands more accounts with no funds 
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traceable to the CD proceeds.128  Finally, the court set a deadline, saying 
that all frozen accounts must either be connected to a complaint or released 
by August 3, 2009.129  On July 28, 2009, Janvey issued a list of 563 inves-
tors and financial advisors with frozen accounts that he was adding as re-
lief defendants.130  These investors represented a combined total frozen of 
$373,000,093.131  When the Fifth Circuit told Janvey that he could not pur-
sue investors as relief defendants, it also told him that all investor accounts 
had to be unfrozen.132  Thus, on November 13, 2009, all accounts — except 
employee brokerage accounts — were available for release.133 
 Conservatively then, the unnecessary freeze was of $373,000,093 in 
investor relief defendants’ accounts, which extended from July 28 to No-
vember 13, 2009.  The 563 investors with frozen funds were harmed fi-
nancially during the 16 weeks of improper freezing.  Although this article 
does not attempt the incredibly complicated task of quantifying the harm 
stemming from investors’ inability to access or reinvest their money, re-
ceive regular payments from their investments, or regularly draw on their 
accounts to live, the damage is undoubtedly substantial.  
The Third Problem: Delay of Ultimate Distribution
 Investors, particularly debtholders, expect to have access to their invest-
ment proceeds.  Of course, in a Ponzi scheme investigation or other case of 
investment fraud, investors will necessarily have to wait for regulators, the 
receiver, and the supervising court to work things out.  However, when a 
receiver extends litigation by spending months seeking receivership funds 
from unfruitful sources, investors are kept unnecessarily from the ultimate 
distribution of the receivership for longer than necessary, thereby increasing 
investors’ economic loss by taxing the time value of their money.  
 Janvey caused delay in the ultimate distribution of the receivership 
by pursuing investors’ principal and employees’ remuneration in the relief 
defendant context.  Since there will be no final distribution (although there 
may be some interim distributions) until the receiver has completed his 
work of garnering receivership assets, this delay was imposed on all Stan-
ford Financial Group creditors, even those who were not relief defendants. 
When the dust finally settles, investors who did not happen to receive CD 
payments can only hope to receive a few pennies on the dollar,134 but hav-
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ing to wait extra months because the receiver is chasing improperly-added 
relief defendants adds insult to injury and again implicates the time value 
of money.  However, since the size and timing of the ultimate distribution 
are so uncertain, the time value of the distribution is also uncertain.  When 
the numbers are known, the time value of the extra months spent trying to 
fruitlessly claw back investors’ principal will be considerable, regardless 
of the multiplier used.
The Fourth Problem: Depletion of the Receivership Estate
 Receivers are paid out of the very receivership they are trying to pro-
tect and enlarge.  Thus, the longer a receiver files claims, the longer he and 
his team of attorneys, accountants, and others are paid; however, the more 
the receiver is paid, the less is available for final distribution to creditors.  
 By April 2010, Janvey had asked for a total of $53,330,000 in fees and 
expenses for him and his team.  Nonetheless, receivers, as officers of the 
court, must have their fees approved by the court, and the court can adjust 
the receiver’s payment for services.  Although each jurisdiction may have 
slightly different factors for deciding how much of a receivers’ fees to pay,135 
in this instance the Northern District of Texas was governed by the “John-
son factors.”136  One of these factors is the “amount involved and the results 
obtained,” which gives some discretion to the court to discount a receiver’s 
application if the fee application is large compared to the amount available 
for distribution or if the receiver’s pursuit of funds is inappropriate.137  Using 
this and other factors, the court temporarily discounted all of Janvey’s fee 
applications by 20 percent, inviting him to reapply for the hold-back amount 
when the size of the recovered receivership became clearer.138 
 In addition to the court’s 20 percent general discount, the court ap-
plied, partially accepting the argument of the SEC and the examiner,139 an 
additional 15 percent temporary discount to fees requested from June to 
November 2009, the period during which the receiver improperly pursued 
relief defendants.  This extra discount reflected the lack of “results ob-
tained” during the period, and showed the court’s tempered concern that a 
receiver should not be rewarded for charging down unfruitful paths.  How-
ever, despite the 35 percent total discount for that five-month period, the 
receiver and his team still received over eight million dollars of receiver-
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ship funds, and the lost 15 percent, like the general 20 percent discount, is 
potentially recoverable.  
 Thus, from the beginning of the receivership to the present, the re-
ceiver has been rewarded handsomely from receivership funds.  In fact, at 
one point, Janvey had asked for approximately 34 percent of everything 
he had recovered from the estimated $8 billion scheme.140  Further, of the 
$53,330,000 requested from February 2009 until April 2010, he has to 
date been awarded about $41,820,000 — approximately 78.42 percent of 
the bill, which he claimed to be already cut by 20 percent before the court 
imposed its own 20 percent discount.141 
 A receiver’s worth must be tied in part to the difference between the 
amount he gathers for distribution and the amount of the receivership es-
tate that he burns through.  In Janvey’s case, this ratio does not seem to be 
very high — much to the chagrin of investors, who are projected to receive 
very little.  For relief defendants, where a receiver successfully pursues 
innocent investors’ funds for redistribution to other innocent investors, the 
best that can happen is that, if successful in his clawbacks, the receiver 
gets paid some of the money coming in while the leftover wealth gets re-
distributed.  Of course, as against net winners in a Ponzi scheme, there is a 
strong equitable argument in favor of this redistribution because anything 
beyond their principal comes from other investors, but this argument loses 
what appeal it has when applied to investors who received less than what 
they put into the scheme.142  If the relief defendant concept were clear, it 
is conceivable that the millions of dollars paid to Janvey and his team for 
their improper pursuit of relief defendants would have remained in the 
pockets of investors instead.  
 Thus, Janvey and his team, relying on a poor but available interpreta-
tion of the relief defendant tool, hurt investors by improperly engaging in-
nocent and already-harmed parties in litigation, preventing these innocent 
parties from accessing their accounts, delaying ultimate distribution, and 
shrinking that distribution by burning receivership funds unnecessarily.  
CONCLUSION
 The meaning of a “legitimate claim or ownership interest” must be re-
inforced, particularly when obvious clawback targets are involved, such as 
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investors and employees of fraudulent schemes.  With cases like George, 
Infinity Group, and Amerifirst Funding placing the plain meaning into con-
fusion, other courts should take every opportunity to settle the definition 
on its unambiguous foundation, thereby promoting judicial and economic 
efficiency.  
 Virtually every case addressing them uses the same definition to de-
scribe relief defendants, but the meaning of one part of that definition (what 
constitutes a legitimate claim) still varies widely — even though words are 
clear on their face.  This unpredictability leads to innocent investors and 
employees, often already harmed by fraud, being further drained by costly 
litigation and clawbacks.  In Adams, investors’ and employees’ accounts 
were frozen for months while litigation, based on uncertainty of the plain 
meaning, dragged on, costing millions of dollars in fees and opportunity 
cost.  These scenes, which have been repeated in other Ponzi scheme and 
financial fraud receiverships, will continue to play themselves out — with 
funds being drained from investors and flowing toward receivers — until 
courts calm the uncertainty by predictably interpreting the meaning of “re-
lief defendant.” Of course, in cases of contractual relationships between the 
entity in receivership and debt holders, the proper course of action will be, 
as it was in Adams, to recognize a legitimate claim to both principal and 
interest amounts under the contract; as a baseline, however, courts should 
recognize that investors have a legitimate claim to their principal and that 
employees have a legitimate claim to their reasonable remuneration.
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65 SEC v. Amerifirst Funding, No. 3:07-CV-1188-D, 2008 WL 1959843 (N.D. 
Tex. May 5, 2008); cf. CFTC v. Kimberlynn Creek Ranch, Inc., 276 F.3d 187, 
192 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that services rendered to an employer is a way of 
demonstrating a legitimate claim); S.E.C. v. Founding Partners Capital Mgmt., 
639 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293–94 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (a debtholder, with whom the 
entity in receivership had a longstanding loan agreement, had to be released 
because such a debtor-creditor relationship — like employment relationships 
spoken of in Kimberlynn Creek Ranch — “constitutes a sufficient legitimate 
ownership interest to preclude treating Sun Capital as a relief defendant.”).
66 Infinity Group, 993 F. Supp. at 331.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Amerifirst Funding, 2008 WL 1959843 at *1.
70 Id.
71 Id. at *5.
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995) (Ponzi scheme 
receivership, in which receiver pursued full defendants under the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, which requires that a defendant defend herself by 
showing that she entered into the investment in good faith and gave reasonably 
equivalent value for it).
74 Amerifirst Funding, 2008 WL 1959843 at *5 (quoting SEC v. DCI 
Telecomms., Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 495, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
75 Another case with analysis favorable to relief defendants attempting 
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to establish a legitimate claim based on the rendering of services (if not 
employment in the traditional sense) is CFTC v. Sarvey, No. 08-C-192, 2008 
WL 2788538 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2008), in which the court found that relief 
defendant Bonfitto (and his company, Bonfitto Trading) had provided services 
— in the form of risky trade guarantees over a long period — to the defendant 
Sarvey in return for compensation. The court noted that, “[T]he issue here is 
not who has the greatest right to the funds. Bonfitto and Bonfitto [T]rading 
are impled as nominal defendants. As such, the only question is whether they 
have any legitimate ownership interest in the property at issue. If they do, they 
may not be impled as merely nominal defendants…. Similarly, it is irrelevant 
whether Bonfitto and Bonfitto trading acted in “good faith” in receiving the 
funds. Plaintiffs may not name parties as nominal defendants while also 
implying that they violated the law….  If the Commission wants to asserts 
[sic] that Bonfitto and Bonfitto Trading obtained the property by some means 
that implies complicity in wrongdoing, it should implead them as outright 
defendants, not nominal defendants.”  Id. at 4–5 (citations omitted).
76 SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2007).
77 Id. at 1151.
78 Id. at 1142.
79 Id. at 1151.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1142.
82 CFTC v. Walsh, 618 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2010).
83 Id. at 221.
84 Id. at 222.
85 Id. at 221–22.
86 Id. at 225–26.
87 Id. at 226–27. Although the court mixes fraudulent transfer law with the 
relief defendant concept, it does so only to analogize and to help determine 
what a legitimate claim might mean in this particular instance.
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 228–29.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 230–231.
92 See, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1995).
93 See First Amended Complaint, SEC v. Stanford, No. 3:09-cv-0298-N (N.D. 
Tex. Feb. 27, 2009).
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94 See Indictment of Robert Allen Stanford, Laura Pendergest-Holt, Gilberto 
Lopez, Mark Kuhrt, and Leroy King, United States v. Stanford, No. H-09-342, 
(S.D. Tex. June 18, 2009).
95 Although Janvey was appointed receiver of the entire SFG umbrella, 
the headquarters of Stanford International Bank were in Antigua — which 
is where all of the records and books were. Antigua appointed its own 
liquidators with possession of the bank’s records, and Janvey battled with the 
Antiguan liquidators for some time; in fact, Janvey struggled for months to be 
recognized as the authoritative receiver in such countries as Canada and the 
UK — each of which had significant Stanford assets. Who is recognized to 
represent SFG in different countries is still unclear. This turf war made work 
cumbersome for Janvey, because instead of having the bank records, he and 
his high-paid team had to sort through SGC records, some of which had little 
or nothing to do with SIBL. For an explanation, and documentation, of these 
struggles for jurisdiction, see the Examiner’s website, Examiner — Stanford 
Financial Group, under the heading “Petition for Recognition by Antiguan 
Liquidators of SIB,” http://www.lpf-law.com/sub/stanford.jsp (last visited 
Dec. 4, 2010). 
96 Amended Order Appointing Receiver, supra note 1.
97 Janvey v. Adams, 588 F. 3d 831, 833 (5th Cir. 2009).
98 Clifford Krauss, 1,000 Stanford Financial Workers Dismissed to Save 
Company Assets, n.Y. times, March 6, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/03/07/business/07stanford.html.
99 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Receiver’s Motion for Order 
Freezing Assets Held in the Names of Certain Relief Defendants, Janvey v. 
Alguire, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2009); Janvey v. Adams, 
588 F.3d 831 (5th Cir. 2009).
100 See Receiver’s First Amended Complaint against Former Stanford 
Employees, Janvey v. Alguire, No. 3:09-cv-00724-N (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2009) 
(adding 202 defendants); Receiver’s Complaint Against Certain Stanford 
Investors, Janvey v. Venger, No. 3:10-cv-366-O (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2010) 
(adding 505 defendants).
101 See, e.g., Kristen Hays, Stanford Receiver: Relief Is on the Way, Houston 
cHron., March 16, 2009, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/
front/6314677.html.
102 Order, SEC v. Stanford, No. 3:09-CV-0298-N (N.D. Tex. June 29, 2009).
103 See generally Receiver’s Amended Complaint Naming Relief Defendants 
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at 2, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2009); see also Brief of 
Appellant Ralph S. Janvey, No. 3:09-CV-0724-N (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2009).
104 Id. (“CD Proceeds — loans, commissions, bonuses or other compensation 
paid to financial advisors for selling CDs, and interest or redemptions to 
investors — are little more than stolen money and do not belong to persons 
who received such funds but belong instead to the Receivership Estate.”).
105 Id. at 13 (“Relief Defendants do not have any rightful ownership interest 
that could justify their retaining possession of these funds, which are properly 
considered assets of the Receivership Estate.”).
106 Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Modify Receivership Order, SEC v. 
Stanford, No. 3:09-cv-0298-N (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2009). The SEC said 
that it should be the only party with power to pursue clawbacks from relief 
defendants and that the receiver’s misinterpretation of the law, which, Janvey 
argued, permitted him to seek principal, was harming investors. Given the 
SEC’s firm stance that principal was protected but interest was not, the Fifth 
Circuit’s ultimate ruling — that investors had a legitimate claim to both 
principal and interest — may have been an unforeseen boon for investors.
107 See generally Transcript of Oral Arguments before the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, Janvey v. Alguire, No. 09-10761 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2009) (SEC 
attempted to prevent Janvey from seeking investors’ principal by seeking a 
modification to his order). 
108 See Stanford Financial Group Receivership, under heading “Receiver 
Statement Regarding Court Hearing Addressing Clawbacks,” http://www.
stanfordfinancialreceivership.com (last visited December 5, 2010).
109 Judge Godbey also recognized the results of Janvey’s zealousness, telling 
him that “everyone in the courtroom is angry with you.” Jeff Carlton, Lawyer 
Wants 34% of Money Recovered in Stanford Case, US news, August 14, 2009, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/2009-08-
14-stanford-attorney_N.htm.
110 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Receiver’s Motion for Order 
Freezing Assets Held in the Names of Certain Relief Defendants, Janvey v. 
Alguire, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2009).
111 Order Extending Injunction, Janvey v. Alguire, No. 09-10761 (5th Cir. 
August 11, 2009); Order Extending Injunction, Janvey v. Letsos, No. 09-
107615 (5th Cir. August 11, 2009).
112 Transcript of Oral Argument Before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals at 1, 
Janvey v. Alguire, No. 09-10761 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2010). The only party at oral 
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argument to claim that investors had a legitimate claim both to principal and 
interest was Michael Quilling, an ex-receiver and attorney for various investor 
relief defendants. Id. at 41. The Examiner only advocated that investors keep 
up to their principal amount. Id. at 31. The SEC focused on the freeze, saying 
that it should be lifted because the receiver could not fulfill the elements of 
a preliminary injunction. Id. at 44–47. Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that 
investors have a legitimate claim to both principal and interest may have been 
unanticipated by even the SEC.
113 276 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that where a trial court does not find 
credible the factual basis of a relief defendant’s asserted legitimate claim — 
here, unverified testimony that the relief defendant had performed services 
in return for exorbitant payments and credit card charges — the court can 
disregard that claim and order disgorgement). 
114 Janvey v. Adams, 588 F.3d 831, 834–35 (5th Cir. 2009). The court in oral 
arguments focused some of its attention on the fact that the SEC was opposed 
to Janvey’s pursuit of principal, whereas in George and Kimberlynn Creek 
Ranch the regulatory authority supported the actions. Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 112, at 18–21. The court seemed to suggest that, if the 
SEC had wanted to pursue the investors as relief defendants, the receiver might 
have a stronger case. Such reasoning is, in my view, faulty and dangerous. It 
questions not whether the relief defendant falls under the definition of a relief 
defendant, but whether the plaintiff wants to pursue the person as a relief 
defendant. Thus, the reasoning places too much power in the hands of the 
regulatory agencies and gives insufficient weight to the actual definition that 
everyone agrees on.
115 This result might reasonably be adjusted downward to include only principal 
in other situations, particularly where investors do not hold certificates of 
deposit with a face value and specific interest amount. That is, where a person 
is an equity holder rather than a debt holder, a court might find that, in light 
of the risk and, perhaps, ownership rights, equity calls for finding a legitimate 
claim in the principal amount invested but not interest. Here, however, the 
Stanford investors held notes that created a contractual relationship with the 
bank, and both principal and investment amounts were covered under that 
contract.
116 588 F.3d at 834–35 (citations omitted).
117 Id. at 835 (quoting CFTC v. Kimberlynn Creek Ranch, 276 F.3d 187, 192 
(4th Cir. 2002)).
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118 Id. at n. 2 (“The George court did not indicate any intention to depart 
from the precedents on which it relied. The opinion does not cast any doubt 
upon our conclusion that the Investor Defendants here, against whom no 
wrongdoing has been alleged, have ownership interests in and legitimate 
claims to the proceeds of the CDs that they purchased from the Stanford Bank 
just as thousands of other innocent investors have done.”).
119 See, e.g., May, 2010 Survey — Federal Regulation of Securities, Annual 
Review of Federal Securities Regulation 65 Bus. law. 923, 963 (“[I]t will 
be important to early investors in Ponzi schemes … for the courts to thrash 
out the criteria for determining when those early investors get to keep their 
money, and when they must give it back for placement in a pool from which 
they will then be paid only a pro rata share.”).
120 In re Independent Clearing House Co., 41 B.R. 985, 1005 n.20 (Bankr. Utah 
1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 77 B.R. 843, 855 & n.19 (D. Utah 1987) 
(holding that the bankruptcy court properly rejected the trustee’s attempt to 
avoid all transfers to the Ponzi scheme’s investors, since, “Even were we to 
find for the trustee on his first theory, the result here would not be equitable.”).
121 See Brief of Intervenor John J. Little, Court-Appointed Examiner at 
Appendices, Janvey v. Alguire, No. 09-10761 (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2009).
122 For example, Phillip Preis, Esq., represented some 63 investors. Id. at ii.
123 Some relief defendants were added sooner than July. For example, many of 
the financial advisors were added on April 15. Receiver’s Complaint Naming 
Stanford Financial Group Advisors as Relief Defendants, SEC v. Stanford 
Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2009).
124 See, e.g., Receiver’s Amended Complaint Naming Relief Defendants at 4, 
Janvey v. Adams, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2009).
125 See, e.g., Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Pershing Ready to Handle Stanford 
Requests, reuters, March 5, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE5247SL20090305 (some investors had been relying on their 
brokerage accounts and investment proceeds for such necessities as rent, 
groceries, and payroll); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 112, 
at 38–40 (description of how deeply the improper freeze was affecting, for 
example, retirees and pension funds).
126 See, e.g., Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Bystanders Pulled into Stanford 
Financial Mess, reuters, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE51J6CY20090220 (many who had not invested in the CD had their 
accounts frozen).
FINANCIAL FRAUD LAW REPORT
286
127 See, e.g., Second Order Authorizing Release of Certain Customer Accounts, 
SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. March 12, 2009).
128 See, e.g., Order Granting Receiver’s Unopposed Motion to Approve 
Procedures to Apply for Review and Potential Release of Accounts, SEC 
v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N, (N.D. Tex. March 27, 2009) 
(giving Janvey the power to agree, with some investors, on the amount that he 
would unfreeze). 
129 Order, supra note 102.
130 This number is smaller than the 913 total relief defendants because some 
relief defendants did not have accounts with the brokerages to which Janvey 
had access.
131 Receiver’s Amended Complaint Naming Relief Defendants at Appendix, 
Janvey v. Alguire, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2009).
132 Adams, 588 F.3d at 834.
133 The announcement and instructions for obtaining control of accounts 
were immediately posted to the receiver’s website: Stanford Financial Group 
Receivership, at heading “Release of Remaining Frozen Investor Accounts 
Following Fifth Circuit Ruling Regarding Claw Backs,” http://www.
stanfordfinancialreceivership.com/#FrozenRelease (last visited Dec. 5, 2010). 
134 See, e.g., Receiver’s Amended Complaint Naming Relief Defendants at 7, 
Janvey v. Alguire, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2009). 
135 See, e.g., Perdue v. Kenny, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1673 (2010) (approving of 
Georgia’s lodestar method (including lodestar enhancements for particularly 
superior attorney performance), which compares fees in the area for similar 
services and uses various factors to determine reasonableness of fees, without 
requiring subjective analysis like that under the Johnson factors).
136 When considering whether a fee award is reasonable, Johnson v. Ga. 
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974) sets out the 
twelve factors the court should consider: “(1) the time and labor involved; 
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to 
perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment 
by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) 
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the 
client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the political 
‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.”
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137 Order Regarding the Receiver’s Third Fee Application at 2, SEC v. Stanford 
Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2010).
138 Id.
139 The SEC and the examiner actually argued that the Receiver should receive 
nothing for work done during this time. 
140 Jeff Carlton, Lawyer Wants 34% of Money Recovered in Stanford Case, 
US news, August 14, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/
industries/brokerage/2009-08-14-stanford-attorney_N.htm.
141 Reply in Support of Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Second Interim Fee 
Application at 1, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. 
Sept. 1, 2009). In his first and second applications for the payment of fees and 
expenses, representing fees incurred from February 17 to May 31, 2009, the 
receiver asked for $27.57 million from the receivership. Receiver’s Motion for 
Approval of Interim Fee Application and Procedures for Future Compensation 
of Fees and Expenses and Brief in Support at 1, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, 
No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2009) (first fee application); 
Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Second Interim Fee Application and Brief 
in Support at 1, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. 
Aug. 4, 2009) (second fee application). On September 10, 2009, the court 
largely followed the SEC and examiner’s recommendations to temporarily 
reduce the fees by 20 percent (potentially recoverable later) and to disallow 
$2.1 million until it was supported by sufficient information. See Examiner’s 
Archived Web Entries as of July 10, 2010 at 4, available at http://www.
lpf-law.com/UserFiles/File/2010%20Docs/Archive_No3_071010.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2010). Thus, Janvey and his team received some $20.3 million 
for the first hundred days. By late 2009, Janvey had asked for another $13.79 
million in his third and fourth applications, representing mainly fees incurred 
from June 1 to September 30, 2009. Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Third 
Interim Fee Application and Brief in Support at 1, SEC v. Stanford Int’l 
Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2009) (third fee application); 
Examiner’s Archived Web Entries as of July 10, 2010 at 4, available at http://
www.lpf-law.com/UserFiles/File/2010%20Docs /Archive_No3_071010.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2010) (detailing Janvey’s fourth fee application). In early 
February 2010, the court agreed with the Receiver, Examiner, and SEC’s 
jointly-proposed fee structure, temporarily discounting the bulk of the third 
and fourth applications by 35 percent (and the $2.1 million, now supported by 
more information, was discounted by 20 percent), and authorizing immediate 
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payment of $10.39 million to the receiver. Order for the Payment of Fees, SEC 
v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2010). For 
work from October 1, 2009 to April 30, 2010, Janvey received $11.13 million, 
even after the 20 percent holdback agreed to by the SEC and the Examiner. 
Order for the Payment of Fees, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-
00298-N (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2010); Order for the Payment of Fees, SEC v. 
Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. Jun. 22, 2010); Order 
for the Payment of Fees, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N 
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2010).
142 At least one court has explicitly considered and rejected the type of 
redistribution scheme addressed in George. In SEC v. Byers, 637 F. Supp. 
2d 166, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, No. 10-312-CV, 2010 WL 4185097 
(2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2010) and aff’d sub nom. SEC v. Malek, No. 09-3583-CV, 
2010 WL 4188029 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2010), the court agreed with the receiver 
that a George-like approach would be unwieldy and harmful: “[T]he Court 
could order investors to repay all the cash distributions they received from 
the Wextrust entities, and then the Receiver could make a distribution based 
on each investors’ actual investment. The practical problems associated 
with this approach, however, preclude it from being a viable option. Many 
of the investors may not have the money, and litigation to collect it would be 
expensive, time-consuming, and, in some instances, cruel.” (emphasis added). 
Janvey, facing an even more complicated and widespread fraud, should have 
followed this reasoning.
